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ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the optimal accumulation o f capital stock, external debt and reputation
by explicitly incorporating the inclination o f a sovereign country to service its external
liabilities and the adverse effects o f not meeting foreign loans’ commitments on the
country’s trustworthy reputation. Repudiation and loss of reputation might lim it the
country’s access to international markets o f credit, consumer and capital goods; and
subsequently might result in a higher average cost of servicing the country’s future external
liabilities, less favorable terms o f trade with the rest o f the w orld and accelerated
depreciation o f capital stock.

*

Amnon Levy is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics, University of Wollongong,
New South Wales, Australia.
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1.

INTRODUCTION
Since 1973 the external debts of the developing countries have been growing at an

unprecedented rate. This has led to a heightened concern about these countries’ ability and
commitment to service and repay their liabilities. This concern is rooted in the fact that a
country’s external debt is a sovereign debt and, unlike a private debt, it is not subject to
laws regarding bankruptcy and enforcem ent of collateral. Thus, when the potential
penalties on default are insufficient, a rise in the country’s degree of indebtedness increases
the country’s inclination to repudiate some, or all, o f its external liabilities. However, as
has been suggested by Jonathan Eaton and Mark Gersovitz (1981) and Kenneth Keltzer
(1984), it is possible that the extent of repudiation is limited by the country’s concern about
the adverse effect of a default on its trustworthy reputation and, subsequently, on its access
to foreign loans. The role of reputation, in conjunction with the desire for continued access
to external loans, as a deterrent for repudiation have been analysed further by Herschel
Grossman and John Van H uyck (1988), who distinguished between justifiable and
excusable defaults and unjustifiable and inexcusable defaults and derived a reputation
equilibrium in which the lenders’ expectations about contingent debt servicing are
validated. By assuming that small countries face competitive foreign investors, Jeremy
Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff (1989) have disputed the role of the ‘reputation for repayment’
as a support for extending loans to small countries and have argued that lending to these
countries should be supported by direct sanctions.
The present paper incorporates both the reputational argument and the possibility of
an implementation of trade sanctions against a defaulting country into the analysis of
external debt and capital accumulation within an intertemporal utility maximisation
framework. In this framework, the indebted country choses the paths of consumption,
import, export and repudiation of external liabilities so as to maximise the sum o f the
discounted utilities from consumption over an infinite planning horizon while taking into
account the evolution of its production capacity, external debt and reputation. In addition to

2

the potentially adverse effect of a deterioration in its trustworthy reputation on access to
foreign loans, the motion equations of the indebted country’s capital stock and external debt
also incorporate the possibility of lenders’ retaliation by limiting the country’s access to
international markets. Trade sanctions against the defaulting country are likely to reduce the
revenues from export, increase the payments on imports and accelerate the depreciation of
capital items whose maintenance depends on foreign spare parts and skill.
The details of this analysis are presented in the following sections. Section 2 displays
the indebted country’s intertemporal utility maximisation as an optimal control problem in
which the control variables are consumption, import, export and rate o f repudiation; and the
state variables are capital, external debt and reputation. It also derives the necessary
conditions for maximum. Section 3 analyses the characteristics of the optimal trajectories of
the control and state variables. Section 4 describes the steady-state levels of repudiation,
reputation, import, capital, output and external debt.

2.

DYNAMIC MODEL OF OPTIMAL DEBT ACCUMULATION AND
REPUDIATION WITH CONSIDERATION FOR RETALIATION
The analysis of capital, external debt and reputation accumulation is based on the

assumption that the indebted country choses the paths of consumption, import, export and
the rate o f repudiation of external liabilities so as to maximise the sum o f the discounted
utilities from consumption during an infinite horizon, while taking into account the effects
of repudiation and retaliatory sanctions on the country’s capital stock, external debt and
reputation. The choice o f an infinite time interval is to enable the assessment of long-run
(steady state) effects.
In mathematical notations, the sovereign’s decision problem is portrayed as
maximising f ° e‘Pl u(ct)dt
(c,m ,x,v) o

(1)

subject to state-transition equations:
Kt = f(Kt, m t ) - c t - x t -5(R t)K t

(2)
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Dt = q(Rt)mt - p(Rt)xt + r(Rt) (1 - Vt) D t

(3)

Rt = - P (vt - v*).

(4)

Here,
u

=

the sovereign’s instantaneous utility,

p

=

the sovereign’s rate of time preference, p> 0 ,

K

=

the country’s capital stock in physical units,

D

=

the country’s amount of external debt in dollars,

R

=

the sovereign’s trustworthy reputation — R>0, and larger values
o f R indicate higher reputation,

c

=

the country’s consumption level in physical units,

m

=

the country’s import level in physical units,

x

=

the country’s export level in physical units,

v

=

the rate of repudiation of external liabilities, 0 <v<l,

v*

=

the excusable rate o f repudiation,

(3

=

the reputational loss’ parameter, P>0,
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=

the rate of capital’s depreciation,

f

=

the aggregate production function (aggregate production is
measured in physical units),

q

=

the aggregate price of imported goods in dollars,

p

=

the aggregate price o f exported goods in dollars,

r

=

the average cost of servicing the external debt, and

t

=

the time index.

It is assumed that:
1.

The instantaneous utility is a concave function of consumption: u' > 0 and u " < 0,
u'( 0 ) = °° and u'(°°) = 0 .

2.

The aggregate production is a concave function of capital and imported inputs: % >
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0, fm > 0, f(0,m) —f(K,0) —0, fKK <
3.

fmm < 0 ar*d fKR^mm " fKmfmK > 0.

The average cost of servicing the external debt rises as the indebted country’s
reputation declines, i.e. rR < 0 .

4.

The rate o f capital depreciation increases as the country’s reputation declines due to
retaliatory measures implem ented by lending countries including a spare-part
embargo, i.e. 8 r < 0 ;

5.

Due to a greater degree of isolation and loss o f world markets, the prices o f imported
goods rise and the prices o f exported goods go down as the indebted country’s
reputation declines, i.e. qR <

6

.

0

and pR > 0 .

There exists an interior solution to the optimal-control problem. This assumption is
compatible with the empirical evidence that, in most cases, repudiation is partial and
retaliatory sanctions are limited rather than total or nil.

In this optimal-control problem, c(t), m(t), x(t) and v(t) are the control functions; and
K(t), D(t) and R(t) are the state variables. The maximum principle developed by Pontryagin
et al (1962) implies that if the control functions and the corresponding trajectories o f the
state variables maximise the objective function

1

subject to the state-transition equations 2 -

4, there exist continuously differentiable co-state functions Ai(t), ^ 2 (t) and ^ 3 (t), such that
the optim al control functions and the corresponding state and co-state functions
simultaneously satisfy the state-transition equations, the co-state transition (or adjoint)
equations and the optim ality conditions. These transition equations and optimality
conditions can be derived by considering the Hamiltonian (H) associated with the
constrained intertemporal decision problem described by equations 1 to 4:
H = e-ptu(c) + X.i[f(K,m)-c-x-8 (R)K]+A.2 [q(R)m-p(R)x+r(R)(l-v)D]-A.3 P(v-v*)
(5)
where, for convenience, the time index t is omitted. In this context, the co-state variables
Ai, A2 and A.3 can be interpreted as the shadow values (in utiles) o f infinitesimal increments
in the country’s capital stock, amount of external debt and level of international reputation,
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respectively. The first term on the right-hand side (r.h.s.) indicates the direct contribution
of current consumption to the overall level o f utility, whereas the second, third and fourth
terms on the r.h.s. display the indirect contributions of current net investment, borrowing
and repudiation of external liabilities, respectively, to the sovereign’s overall utility level
through altering future consumption possibilities.
In addition to the state-transition equations, the necessary conditions include the
adjoint equations
X l = - M f K (K ,m ) - 8 (R)]

(6 )

l

= ->-2 r(R )(l-v)

(7)

=

(8 )

2

^3

5 r K-X-2 [qR - pR x + rR(l - v)D]

and the optimality conditions

Hc = e - P t u ' ( c ) - X i = 0

(9)

H m = Xi fm (K,m) + X2 q(R) = 0

(10)

Hx = - A,i - X.2 p(R) =

(1 1 )

Hv = -

^-2

0

r(R) D - X,3 P = 0.

(12)

Finally, the transversality conditions require that, from the sovereign’s perspectives,
there is no value to the terminal levels of capital, external debt and reputation. As long as
the sovereign’s rate of time preference is positive, these conditions are also satisfied in the
case where the terminal levels of the state variables are positive.
The time differentials o f the optimality conditions 9-12 yield singular-control
equations describing the transitions of the control variables. The singular-control equations,
the adjoint equations

6 -8

and the state-transition equations 2-4 constitute a system o f non

linear differential equations. Due to its size and complexity, it is impossible to solve this
system and identify its asymptotic properties without additional strong assumptions and a
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substantial loss o f generality. Thus, the following sections present only some essential
features of the optimal paths of the control and state variables and the steady-state levels of
these variables.

3.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OPTIMAL TRAJECTORIES
The adjoint equation

6

requires that, along the optimal path, the rate o f change in the

shadow price of capital is equal to the difference between the capital’s rate o f depreciation
and the marginal product of capital. The optimality condition 9 indicates that at any instance
within the planning horizon the shadow price of capital should be equal to the marginal
utility from current consumption and thus reflect the trade-off between current consumption
and future consumption.
The adjoint equation 7 requires that along the optimal path the rate o f change in the
shadow value of external debt is equal, in absolute terms, to the repudiation-free interest
rate (1 - v)r. Furthermore, the optimality condition 11 implies that the ratio of the shadow
prices o f capital and external debt should be equal to the price o f the country’s export, and
in recalling the optimality condition 9:
X2 = -e-ptu'(c)/p(R ).

(13)

By substituting 13 and 9 into the optimality condition 10 for Xi and X2 we obtain further
that along the optimal path the marginal product of the imported inputs should be equal to
the country’s import-export price ratio:
fm(K,m) = q(R)/p(R).

(14)

Note further that since the country’s import-export price ratio declines with R and since the
marginal product of imported inputs is diminishing, the greater the country’s trustworthy
reputation the larger the amount of imported goods along the optimal path.
The optimality condition 12 implies that along the optimal path the rate o f repudiation
of external liabilities is such that the marginal gains (in utiles) from lowering the costs of

7

servicing the country’s external debt are offset by the adverse effect o f the loss of
reputation on present and future consumption and utility levels. By substituting equation 13
into the optimality condition

12,

the shadow value o f an infinitisimal increase in the

country’s reputation can be expressed as
X3 = r(R )D e-rtu'(c)/Pp(R).

(15)

By differentiating the optimality condition 9 with respect to t it can be shown
-pe-pt u'(c) + e-pt u"(c) c and in recalling conditions

6

=

(16)

0

and 9 we obtain

c = -[fK (K,m) - 8 (R) - p]u'(c)/u"(c).

(17)

Similar to the optimal growth theory’s proposition (e.g. Cass, 1965), equation 17 implies
that, given that the sovereign’s marginal utility is diminishing, the consumption increases,
remains the same, or decreases over time if the marginal product of capital is greater, equal,
or smaller than the rental (or user) cost of capital

(8

+ p). This effect of the marginal net

return on capital is amplified by the degree of concavity of the sovereign’s utility function.
Note that in this framework, the marginal product of capital increases (decreases) with the
amount o f the imported inputs when K and m are complementaries (substitutes) in
production, and the rental cost of capital declines with the country’s level of reputation.
By taking the time differential of the optimality condition 11

-Xl - i 2 P(R) - tep (R ) R = 0

and in recalling conditions

6

(18)

, 7, 9 and 11 it can be shown that the transition o f the

country’s international reputation is given by
R = {(1 - v)r(R) - [fK (K,m) - 8 (R)] p(R)}/pR(R).

(19)

Since pR is assumed to be positive, whenever the repudiation-free interest rate is greater,
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equal, or smaller than the foreign exchange receipts from exporting the net marginal
product of capital, the country’s reputation increases, remains the same, or decreases,
respectively. The change in the country’s reputation is amplified by the vulnerability of the
country’s export to retaliatory measures implemented by the lending countries as indicated
by the export price’s derivative w.r.t. R. Note that for given levels of K and m, the higher
the country’s reputation the lower the repudiation-free interest rate and the greater the
foreign exchange receipts from exporting the net marginal product o f capital and hence the
greater the country’s inclination to repudiate and lower its reputation.
The time differential of the optimality condition 12 implies
- i 2 r(R)D - X2 [rR (R) DR + r(R)D] - A* p = 0
and by substituting conditions 7 and

8

(20)

•
©
into equation 20 for X2 and A.3 , respectively, and in

recalling that along the optimal path A,i and X2 behave in accordance with condition

11,

it

can be shown that
r(R)2(l-v)D - rR(R)DR-r(R)D + pfqRin-pRX+rR (l-v)D + p(R) 8r (R)K] = 0.

(21)

By dividing both sides of equation 21 by r(R)D and rearranging terms, it can be shown that
along the optimal path the instantaneous rate o f change in the country’s external debt is
given by

5 =®

[(1‘v)rR + P(R) 8 r (K/D) + (qRm-PRx)/D - i-rR/P] + (1-V) r(R).

(22)

Equation 22 and the assumptions that 8 r < 0, qR < 0 and pR > 0 indicate that the higher the
country’s leverage (D/K) and the lower the sensitivity of the country’s import and export
prices to changes in reputation, the higher the optimal rate of external debt accumulation.
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4.

STEADY-STATE

LEVELS

OF

REPUDIATION,

REPUTATION,

IMPORT, CAPITAL STOCK OUTPUT AND EXTERNAL DEBT
•

•

®

By setting R=0 in equations 4,19 and 22, c=0 in equation 17, and D--0 in equation
22

, we obtain that in steady state (ss):
Vss = v*

(1

(23)

- vss) r(Rss) - [fK (Kss, m ss) - § (R ss)]p (R ss) = 0

fK (Kss, mss) = 8 (Rss) +p

(24)
(25)

B
r ( R s s ) [( 1 - v ss)rR(R ss) '' P ( R ss ) S r ( R ss ) ( K ss/ D ss ) + (q R(R ss)m ss ' P r ( R ss ) x ss ) / D ss ]

+ (1 ■vss) r(Rss) = 0.

(26)

The steady-state levels o f repudiation and reputation
Equation 23 indicates that in steady state the country’s rate of repudiation o f external
debt should be equal to the excusable rate. The substitution of 23 and 25 into equation 24
implies that the steady-state level o f the country’s reputation should be such that the
repudiation-free interest rate is equal to the sovereign’s rate of time preference times the
stationary price of the country’s export:
( l - v * ) r ( R ss) = pp(Rss)

(27)

By taking the total differential of equation 27 and in recalling that 0 < v* < 1, rR < 0 and
pR >

0

we obtain that the higher the excusable repudiation rate and the rate o f time

preference, the lower the country’s reputation in steady state:
dR ss___________ r(Rss)
dv*
( 1 - v*) r R(R ss) - p p R(R ss)

< 0

(28)

dRss ___________ P(Rss)__________ < q
dp
( 1 - v*) r R(R ss) - p p R(R ss)

(29)

and
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The above derivatives suggest further that the more sensitive the average cost o f
servicing the external debt and the price o f export to changes in the country’s reputation,
the smaller the effect of an increase in either the excusable reputation rate or the rate of time
preference on the steady-state level o f the country’s reputation.
In order to explore further the effects of the responses of r and p to changes in R on
the country’s reputation in steady state let us consider the following linear forms:
r = rmax ■r lR rmax> r i > 0

(30)

and
P = Pmin + PlR Pmin, Pi > 0

(31)

where rmax and p min are the average cost of servicing the external debt and the aggregate
price of export when the country’s reputation reaches the low est level (i.e., R=0),
respectively, and ri and p i indicate the sensitivities o f the average contracted interest rate
and price of export to changes in the country’s reputation, respectively. The substitution of
these forms into equation 27 leads to the following close-form solution to the country’s
stationary level of reputation:
(1 ' v *)rmax “ PPmin
ss —
PP1 + r i (1 - V*)

(32)

This solution implies
dRss
dr,max

(1 - v*)
>0
pri + r i ( l - v*)

(33)

- f ^ L = ----------=2---------- < 0
apmin p r i + r i ( l - v * )

(34)

. - d - V ) [(l-v*)rmax - PPmin] | „ as
dri

[p p i + r i ( l - v * )]2

>

1

dpi

[PPI + n ( l - v * )]2

>

| p

(35)

<

o as (l-v*)rmax I ppmi„.
<

(36)
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The steady-state levels o f import, capital and production
In order to find the steady-state levels of import (mss), capital (Kss) and production
(yss), consider the following Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function
y = K «i m«2 0 < a i , a 2 < 1

(37)

Then, in recalling equations 14 and 25 it can be shown that the marginal products of
imported inputs and capital in steady state should be equal to:
a 2 Kss« l mss«2-l = q(Rss)/p(Rss)

(38)

a iK ssal-lm ss“2 = 8(Rss) + p.

(39)

Equations 38 and 39 indicate that the steady-state levels of import and capital are such that:

K ss = ( a / a } ^ ( Rss)/p(R$g)
8

(40)

(R SS) + p
aj

1-oq

mss = f 5 ( R ss) + P \ - « 2+ a l a 2 f q(R ss)

V

«1

)

Y c t 2+ai a 2

P(Rss)J
l-a 2

K ss =

+

(4 1 )

2(l+aj a2)-a i

q(Rss)

-a2+ai a 2

ai

1

(l-a2+ai a 2) _

(42)

a 2 P(Rss)J

The steady-state level of output can be found by substituting equations 41 and 42 in the
aggregate production function.
Equation 40 implies that, for a given level o f reputation, the steady-state ratio of
capital to imported inputs in production:

1

.

increases with the capital-import’s production elasticities ratio,

2

.

increases with the import-export price ratio in steady state,

3.

decreases with the rate of depreciation of capital in steady state, and

4.

decreases with the sovereign’s rate of time preference.
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Moreover, equations 41 and 42 indicate that, for a given level o f reputation, Kss, mss, and
subsequently yss, increase with:

1.

the depreciation rate of capital,

2

. the rate o f time

preference, and 3. the import-export’s price ratio.
Note, however, that the effect o f the country’s steady-state reputation level on the
capital-import ratio is not clear, since both the import-export’s price ratio and the capital’s
depreciation rate— appearing in the num erator and denom inator o f equation 40,
respectively— decline with Rss. Therefore, if the import-export’s price ratio is more (less)
sensitive than the capital’s depreciation rate to changes in R, the lower the country’s
reputation the more (less) capital intensive the country’s production process in steady state.
Note further that the effect of the rate of time-preference (i.e. the degree o f myopia)
on the capital-import ratio in steady state is not obvious once the country’s reputation is not
held constant. On the one hand, and as indicated above, an increase in the rate o f timepreference directly raises the rental costs of capital and hence moderates the steady-state’s
capital-import ratio. On the other hand, and in view of equation 32, an increase in the rate
o f time preference lowers the country’s reputation and hence indirectly affects the capitalimport ratio in accordance with the relative sensitivity of the capital’s depreciation rate and
the import-export’s price ratio. Thus, the fu ll effect of the rate o f time preference is clear
only in the case where the import-export price ratio is less sensitive than the rate o f capital
depreciation to changes in the country’s reputation. In this case, both the direct and indirect
effects of an increment in the rate of time preference are negative and hence reduce the
stationary capital-import ratio. When the import-export’s price ratio is more sensitive than
the depreciation rate to changes in the country’s reputation, the indirect effect o f an
increment in the rate o f time preference on the stationary capital-im port ratio in the
production process is positive and offsets the direct effect.

The steady-state level o f external debt
#
•
By setting D and R to be equal to zero in equation 21 the country’s external debt in
__

steady state (Dss) is given by

13

^
[pR(R ss)xss ■
(Rss)m ssl ' P(Rss) S r (R ss) K ss
U cc —
“
.
(1 - v*) [rR (R ss) + r(R ss) 2 /P ]

(4 j )

In recalling the assumptions that pR is positive and qR and 8 r are negative, it is clear that
the numerator is positive. However, in view of the assumption that the contracted interest
rate decreases as the country’s reputation rises (i.e. rR < 0 ), the sign of the denominator of
the term on the r.h.s. of equation 43 is not clear and hence
D ss| 0 a s r ( R s s ) | ^

(44)

where Ess is the stationary elasticity (in absolute terms) of the contracted interest rate with
respect to the indebted country’s reputation. As can be expected, the more sensitive the
country’s reputation to repudiation (i.e. the larger the (3) the smaller the country’s external
liabilities in steady state, and for a sufficiently large P and contracted interest rate elasticity
it is possible that the initially indebted country will be a net creditor in steady state,
provided that the steady-state is reached. Equation 43 indicates further that the size o f D ss,
in absolute terms, increases with:

1.

the country’s steady-state levels of import, export,

capital stock and the price of export; and 2 . the sensitivity of the export’s price, im port’s
price and capital depreciation rate to changes in the country’s reputation. It is important to
note further that an increment in the excusable rate of repudiation directly increases the
stationary level of external debt if rss > bE/Rss. However, in recalling equation 28, the
direct effect of v* on Dss is likely to be indirectly moderated by the deterioration in the
country’s stationary level of reputation.
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